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LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
TORTS
William E. Crawford*
THE APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 2317 TO LATENT BRAKE DEFECTS
The death knell for the latent brake failure defense was sounded
by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Arceneaux v. Domingue.' Having
collided with the plaintiff's car from the rear, the defendant main-
tained that the cause of the acccident was the unexplained failure of
the car's brakes. A jury found in favor of the defendant, and the
court of appeal affirmed. In reversing the decision, however, the
supreme court observed that the evidence did not support a find-
ing of latent brake defect. The court apparently relied on a
presumption of fault on the part of the driver causing the rear-end
collision, the presumption being analogous to that established in
Simon v. Ford Motor Co.,2 in which the supreme court announced
that a driver going into the lane of another automobile and colliding
with it had the burden of exculpating himself from the slightest
fault. At the same time, the court found that a latent brake failure
renders an automobile "defective" within the contemplation of Civil
Code article 2317 and the Loescher rule.' Although the court found
as a fact that the brakes were not defective, it nevertheless held
that the defendant was subject to the rule of liability for custodian-
ship of defective things. Additionally, in its discussion of the
Loescher rule, the court, through apparent inadvertence, omitted
the requirement that the thing have a defective condition that
creates an unreasonable risk of injury."
In view of the court's application of Loescher to defective brake
cases, potential defendants should be aware in actual brake failure
cases that the pleading or admission of the brake failure may well
be construed as an admission of liability to the same extent as an
admission of negligence. The defenses which will be recognized are
the traditional Loescher defenses of victim fault, third-party fault,
or irresistible force.
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 365 So. 2d 1330 (La. 1978). For a detailed analysis of the tort issue in
Arceneaux, see Note, The Demise of the Latent Brake Defect Doctrine in Louisiana,
40 LA. L. REV. 847 (1980).
2. 282 So. 2d 126 (La. 1973).
3. Loescher v. Parr, 324 So. 2d 441 (La. 1976).
4. Justice Dennis pointed out this omission in his concurring opinion. 365 So. 2d
at 1336.
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The court in Arceneaux also announced that, in a case of brake
failure, "the owner, charged with responsibility of maintenance,
should not escape liability merely because another person was driv-
ing the car."' In a concurring opinion, Justice Dennis reiterated this
position by maintaining that "if the cause of the injury was due to a
defect or vice in the automobile, the owner, who has custody or care
of the vehicle even while it is in his friend's possession, is liable ...."
Although article 2317 speaks only of one who has the custody of the
thing, Justice Tate in the Loescher opinion concluded that the word
"custody" contained in the English translation of the French Civil
Code article was not as broad a term as the French word "garde."7
French treatise writers are also clearly of the opinion that the
owner of a thing remains responsible for injuries resulting from its
defective condition, even though another who had custody of it may
also be liable The owner in this situation, however, is not liable if
the thing had been stolen.'
Another important aspect of Arceneaux that should be noted is
that the liability of the owner of the car with defective brakes, be-
ing driven in a permitted-use situation, accords with the car owner's
liability insurance coverage.
LIABILITY OF AN OWNER FOR DAMAGE CAUSED BY THE RUIN OF
HIS BUILDING
In Olsen v. Shell Oil Co.,1" the Louisiana Supreme Court added
yet another category to Louisiana's so-called strict liability law.
Shell Oil Company was the owner of a fixed drilling platform
situated in the Gulf of Mexico, with a modular drilling rig and
modular living unit attached to the platform. A water heater in the
living quarters exploded because of a malfunctioning pressure relief
valve and caused the injuries made subject of the federal litigation.
The supreme court held the following:
1) Shell's platform was a "building" within the meaning of Civil
Code article 2322.
5. 365 So. 2d at 1335.
6. 365 So. 2d at 1337 (Dennis, J., concurring).
7. The Loescher court noted in a footnote that the word "garde" includes the
owner as well as the one in custody of the thing. 324 So. 2d at 447 n.6.
8. E.g., 2 H. MAZEAUD, J. MAZEAUD ET L. MAZEAUD, TRAIT9f TH9ORIQUE ET PRATI-
QUE DE LA RESPONSABILIT9 CIVILE D9LICTUELLE ET CONTRACTUELLE n° 1160 (6th ed. 1970).
9. Id. at n' 1170.
10. 365 So. 2d 1285 (La. 1978). See Note, Olsen v. Shell Oik Expanded Liability
for Offshore Oil Platform Owners, 40 LA. L. REV. 233 (1979). Olsen was given in
response to questions certified to the Louisiana Supreme Court by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
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2) Shell was the owner of the modular living unit attached to
its drilling platform.
3) The explosion of the water heater constituted a "ruin" of the
building under article 2322.
4) Shell's obligation to third parties (the employees of an in-
dependent contractor working on the platform) was non-
delegable.
5) Consistent with the foregoing finding, the traditional in-
dependent contractor defense is not recognizable either by name
or in the form of "fault of a third party."
6) Shell is the owner of a "building," in owning the drilling
platform, even though it does not own the soil underlying the
building.
Olsen is notable because of its application of the term "building"
to a drilling rig and because of its further development of the Loui-
siana strict liability rule under the Civil Code. In laying the founda-
tion for liability, the court defined "ruin" of the building as a condi-
tion representing an unreasonable risk of injury, which serves for
the finding of non-negligent fault on the part of the owner. As is
consistent with both Loescher and the general theory of so-called
strict liability, the showing of due care on the owner's part to avoid
the ruin is irrelevant. According to the majority's opinion in Olsen,
the only defenses allowed are fault of a third party and irresistible
force. It may be of significance to note that "victim fault" as set out
in Loescher and in related cases was omitted by the court from the
defenses to article 2322. It is difficult to ascertain if the omission
represents a narrowing of defenses permitted for actions under arti-
cle 2322 as contrasted with those allowed under article 2317.
Since the "victim fault" defense has been omitted, one wonders
whether assumption of risk would be a defense in behalf of Shell if
the facts satisfied the traditional requirements of assumption of
risk. The rush toward strict liability and the steady chopping away
of traditional defenses are so clear and forceful that this writer
believes the elimination of victim fault, even assumption of risk, was
probably intended by the court. This inference is drawn in part from
Justice Tate's desire to limit victim fault as described in Loescher
to assumption of risk, apparently eliminating contributory
negligence as acceptable victim fault." It is also of significance that
the court pointed out that even if the drilling platform did not
qualify as a "building" within the meaning of article 2322, liability
would have been found under article 2317, which provides a rule of
strict liability for defective "things."
11. See Hebert v. Maryland Cas. Co., 369 So. 2d 708 (La. 1979).
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The opinion contains a puzzling explanation of third-party fault.
The court stated that "[ajn owner may be exculpated from liability
under article 2322 for a premise-defect, if the victim is injured not
by reason of the defect, but instead because of the fault of some
third person." 2 It would seem a fortiori that if there were no defect
or ruin in the premises, then article 2322 would not be applicable
and no affirmative defense would be required. The requirements for
the "fault of a third person" defense are drawn so tightly that an
owner satisfying that defense would seem to be not liable even
without the defense, since it would not have been a ruin of his
building or a vice therein that caused the damage. The interpreta-
tion of third-party fault in Olsen is significant because this writer
sees no reason to interpret the defense differently for article 2322
than for article 2317.
EXPANSION OF THE LOESCHER "DEFECT" RULE
In the same vein of expanding liability, the Louisiana Supreme
Court in Marquez v. City Stores Co. 8 held that the fact that a child
clad in tennis shoes caught his foot in the space between an
escalator's moving steps and the side of the escalator established
that the escalator was defective within the contemplation of article
2317. The court correctly characterized Loescher as requiring the
showing of defect before invoking article 2317. Recognizing that the
court of appeal found that the plaintiff in the trial court had not proved
a defect, Justice Dixon, as author of the majority opinion, concluded
that the fact the child's shoe was caught in the escalator proved, in
and of itself, that the escalator was defective. He further observed
in an ominous statement in his opinion that "[i]f this escalator were
safe for small children with small feet, then James' shoe could not
have been caught in this opening."14
Otis Elevator Co., the manufacturer of the escalator, attempted
to show that the opening in which the shoe got caught was not more
than three-sixteenths of an inch in size and that the national stan-
dards for safe escalator construction allow three-eighths of an inch.
Justice Dixon maintained that a showing of those measurements
was "insufficient to rebut the inference that there was a vice or
defect in this escalator which caused an unreasonable risk of harm
to another."'"
12. 365 So. 2d at 1293.
13. 371 So. 2d 810 (La. 1979).
14. Id at 814.
15. Id at 813-14.
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In the opinion of this writer, Justice Dixon has found in Marquez
the existence of a defect, not from a flaw in the manufacture or
maintenance, but in the policy-conclusion that the escalator was
unreasonably dangerous. This defect under article 2317 was proven,
therefore, in precisely the same fashion as the defect in Weber v.
Fidelity & Casualty Insurance Co."6 It does not appear from the
origin of Loescher, or from the cases applying Loescher prior to
Marquez, that this mode of proof of defect was intended. It
eliminates, or changes entirely, the notion that something is
physically wrong with the product. Under Justice Dixon's standard
in Marquez, it is only necessary for the court to conclude as a policy
matter that the thing was unreasonably dangerous; the existence of
a defect is then inferred. This certainly appears to be absolute
liability.
The important consideration missing from the Marquez opinion
is an inquiry into whether this was, in truth, an "unreasonable risk."
Our vast body of tort law, both in Louisiana and in the common law
states, contains a rich collection of resources for the evaluation of
conduct as an unreasonable risk. Perhaps the most comprehensive
and succinct statement is found in sections 291, 292, and 293 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, which read as follows:
291. Unreasonableness: How Determined; Magnitude of Risk
and Utility of Conduct
Where an act is one which a reasonable man would recog-
nize as involving a risk of harm to another, the risk is un-
reasonable and the act is negligent if the risk is of such
magnitude as to outweigh what the law regards as the
utility of the act or of the particular manner in which it is
done.
292. Factors Considered in Determining Utility of Actor's Con-
duct
In determining what the law regards as the utility of the
actor's conduct for the purpose of determining whether
the actor is negligent, the following factors are im-
portant:
(a) the social value which the law attaches to the interest
which is to be advanced or protected by the conduct;
(b) the extent of the chance that this interest will be ad-
vanced or protected by the particular course of conduct;
(c) the extent of the chance that such interest can be ad-
16. 259 La. 599, 250 So. 2d 754 (1971).
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equately advanced or protected by another and less danger-
ous course or conduct.
293. Factors Considered in Determining Magnitude of Risk
In determining the magnitude of the risk for the purpose
of determining whether the actor is negligent, the follow-
ing factors are important:
(a) the social value which the law attaches to the interests
which are imperiled;
(b) the extent of the chance that the actor's conduct will
cause an invasion of any interest of the other or of one of
a class of which the other is a member;
(c) the extent of the harm likely to be caused to the in-
terests imperiled;
(d) the number of persons whose interests are likely to be
invaded if the risk takes effect in harm.
Justice (then Judge) Tate used these criteria in deciding the
case of Goff v. Carlino. " Judge Culpepper of the third circuit also used
the Restatement criteria in his opinion in Allien v. Louisiana Power
& Light Co. 8 It would not seem to be a rash assumption that when
Justice Tate wrote the Loescher opinion and used the concept of
unreasonable risk, he had in mind the same criteria which he applied
in Goff and which Judge Culpepper subsequently used in Allien.
It is summitted that an application of those criteria to the Mar-
quez case would result in a finding that the escalator did not repre-
sent an unreasonable risk of injury. The court found as a fact that it
was a rare occurrence, though not a "freak" accident. Certainly,
under a Weber evaluation, Otis would have been able to pose a state
of the art defense on the grounds that the escalator was made as
well as possible, given the industry's then current state of
technology.
The Marquez fact-of-the-accident theory for proving defect was
utilized by the court in previous cases, notably Moreno's, Inc. v.
Lake Charles Catholic High Schools, Inc.,9 which was a redhibition
case based upon the failure of an air conditioning unit. The unit was
found to be defective because it failed mechanically prior to the end
of the period for which it was designed to last in proper functioning
order. The other case, of course, is Weber, the foundation products
17. 181 So. 2d 426 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
18. 202 So. 2d 704 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
19. 315 So. 2d 660 (La. 1975).
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liability case in which the court based its chain of legal theory upon
the fact that, since the cattle treated with defendant's cattle dip
died, the most reasonable hypothesis was that the cattle dip was
defective. Such evidentiary presumptions expand liability just as
easily as a significant change of policy in substantive duty.
